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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Does the term "natural mother" in the California Uniform
Parentage Act denote the woman whose egg provides the genetic
material for the creation of a child?
2.
In order to comport with the constitutions of CaTifornia
and the United States, must the term "natural mother" in the
California Uniform Parentage Act denote the woman whose egg
provides the genetic material for the creation of a child?
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S023721
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ANNA J.,

)
)

Plaintiffand Petitioner,

)
)

V.
mark

)
)

C.

et al.,

)
)

Defendantsand Respondents.

)
)

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
This is an action to determine the parental rights of a child
created pursuant to a surrogacy arrangement.

Respondents Mark and

Crispina C. and Petitioner Anna J. brought separate actions in the
trial court to establish parental rights.
consolidated for judicial economy.

These actions were

(C.T. 8.)

Orange County Superior Court Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr.,
sitting without a jury, found Mark and Crispina C. to be the
biological, genetic, and therefore natural parents of the child,
thus entitling them to full parental rights under California law.
(C.T. 608.)

The court entered judgment pursuant to these findings

on November 21, 1990.

(C.T. 609.)

terminated Anna's visitation rights.

Judge Parslow further
(C.T. 609.)

On October 8, 1991, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's judgment.
App. 3d 1557 (1991).

Anna J. v. Mark C^, 234 Cal.

The validity of the trial court's judgment
1

is a question of law requiring de novo review by this court.

See

Cal. Teachers Ass^n v. San Dieao Community College Dist.. 28 Cal.
2d 692, 699 (1981).
—

Statement of Facts

_

Mark and Crispina C., married in 1982, unsuccessfully
attempted to conceive a child throughout the first two years of
their marriage.

(R.T. 1200.)

Crispina was forced to have a

hysterectomy in 1984 because of tumors and other complications
with her uterus.

{R.T. 1200.)

Though she was left unable to bear

a child, Crispina retained the capacity to produce eggs.
791.)

(R.T.

In 1989, wishing to raise a child created by their own

genes, Mark and Crispina considered utilizing a surrogate mother,
who would be implanted by Crispina's egg that had already been
fertilized by Mark's sperm.

(R.T. 1201.)

Anna J., a nurse employed at the same hospital as Crispina,
approached Crispina in October 1989 after learning from a co
worker about Mark and Crispina's difficulties.

(R.T. 783-84.)

Anna offered to be a surrogate on the couple's behalf.
784.)

(R.T.

Anna and the C.'s met soon thereafter and discussed at

length details of the potential arrangement.

(R.T. 1203.)

During

that meeting, Anna represented to Mark and Crispina that she had
been accepted as a surrogate by the Center for Surrogate
Parenting.

(R.T. 1203.)

Mark understood this to mean that she

had been through extensive psychological counseling, medical
exams, and other screening to ensure her suitability as a
surrogate.

(R.T. 1202.)

On January 15, 1990, Mark, Crispina, and Anna each signed a
contract entitled "Contract:

IVF/Embryo Transfer"

(referring to

2

A

in vitro fertilization).

(C.T. 11.)

This contract called for

Anna to be implanted with an embryo created by in vitro
fertilization of an egg from Crispina and sperm from Mark.
14.)

(C.T.

Anna agreed to carry and bear this child after the —

implantation, and to relinquish all parental rights to the child.
(C.T. 14-16.)

The contract stated that Mark and Crispina were

"morally, biologically, ethically, and contractually" the natural
parents of the baby.

(C.T. 12.)

As such, the terms provided that

after birth the child would be taken into Mark and Crispina's home
"as their child."

(C.T. 14.)

In return, Mark and Crispina agreed

to pay Anna $10,000, in installments ending six weeks after the
birth, and to take out a $200,000 life insurance policy on Anna's
life.

(C.T. 23.)
On January 19, 1990, doctors implanted the embryo created

from Mark and Crispina into Anna.

(R.T. 791.)

On February 10th,

doctors confirmed with an ultrasound that Anna was pregnant.
(R.T. 797.)

Anna obtained a Polaroid photograph of the

ultrasound, on which she wrote,

"Cris's baby 2-10-90," and posted

the Polaroid in the nurses' station at the hospital where Anna and
Crispina both worked.

(R.T. 798.)

After the pregnancy was confirmed, relations soured between
Anna and the C.'s.

At this time, Mark and Crispina first learned

that Anna had misrepresented certain crucial facts to them.
Although Anna had previously stated otherwise, she was never
accepted by the Center for Surrogate Parenting.

(R.T. 1353.)

Anna also represented to Mark and Crispina that she had had only
one previous pregnancy, which resulted in her daughter Erica.
(R.T. 786; R.T. 1204.)

However, Anna failed to disclose that she

had had four other pregnancies, two of which resulted in
miscarriages, the other two in stillbirths.

(R.T. 786.)

On July 23, 1990, Anna wrote Mark and Crispina a letter in
which-she demanded that the remaining payments be advanced
immediately, before the agreed due dates.

(C.T. 33-35.)

Anna

stated that if Mark and Crispina did not comply with her demands,
then they might "not get the baby," and they would hear from her
lawyers.

(C.T. 35.)

Even so, Anna's letter referred to the baby

as "the child of someone else"

(as opposed to herself) and stated,

"[0]nce this baby is born, my hands are free of this deal."
34-35.)

(C.T.

Mark and Crispina had twice previously accommodated Anna

by making early payments of both the first and second trimester
amounts (R.T. 829), despite Anna's false statements to the media
that payments had been late.

(R.T. 817.)

Anna did not respond to

Mark's subsequent attempts to contact her regarding the letter.
(R.T. 1238.)

After learning that Anna intended to pursue

litigation to keep the baby (R.T. 1238-39), Mark and Crispina
filed this suit on August 15, 1990.

(C.T. 1.)

From the time of Anna's initial contact with Mark and
Crispina in October 1989 until she filed suit, Anna never
expressed to Mark and Crispina any -desire to pursue parental
rights to. the baby, particularly because she was not genetically
related.

(R.T. 1205-06',)

incubator."

(R.T. 1204.)

Anna often referred to herself as "an
Catherine Gewertz, a reporter for the

Los Angeles Times, interviewed Anna in August 1990.

(R.T. 1004.)

During this interview, Anna expressed that she felt no bonding to
the baby since it was not made from her genetic material.
1006.)

Ms. Gewertz quoted Anna in her newspaper article as
4

(R.T.

saying,

"If it had been my egg it would have made a real big

difference.

But with I.V.F.

connection to me.
day on^"

[in vitro fertilization] there is no

There has been detachment from the baby from

(R.T. 1007-08.)

_

Sara Duran, Anna's roommate from April to September 1990,
also testified that Anna had told her repeatedly that the C.'s
were the baby's parents, that Anna never had any intentions to
)<eep the child, and that she entered into the agreement because
she needed money to pay a welfare debt.

(R.T. 1311-12.)

Anna

told Ms. Duran in April 1990 that she owed the welfare department
$10,000.

(R.T. 1342.)

Anna had been contacted by an Orange

County Welfare Fraud Investigator a few days prior to her letter
to Mark and Crispina on July 23, 1990.

(R.T. 806.)

According to Ms. Duran, Anna consistently expressed
satisfaction with Mark and Crispina, and with the surrogacy
arrangement up until the time she decided to file suit.
1313.)

(R.T.

Anna first considered litigation after writing the July

23rd letter because Mark and Crispina, in Anna's words,
what I said."

(R.T. 1318.)

"won't do

However, Anna did not intend to keep

the baby for herself; rather, she stated she would put the baby up
for adoption in the event she won the lawsuit.

(R.T. 1319.)

Anna-and her lawyers sought publicity from the media,
eventually gaining an appearance on the "Phil Donahue" television
show.

(R.T. 1129.)

She acquired sufficient funds from this

appearance to discharge a court judgment in favor of the Orange
County Welfare Department.

(R.T. 830-31.)

Ms. Duran stated she disapproved of the manner in which Anna
treated her daughter Erica.

Ms. Duran and Anna had recurring
5

disputes regarding Anna's housekeeping and personal habits, and
her use of profanity.

(R.T. 1344.)

In addition, Ms. Duran noted

that Anna usually fed Erica fast food, doughnuts, or gummy bears
for dinher.

(R.T. 1337-36.)

~

pr. Justin Call, a psychiatrist and pediatrician with
extensive experience researching genetic variables in infants,
testified that one's genetic makeup determines how the individual
will respond to various stimuli in one's environment, including
while in the uterus.

(R.T. 914.)

Dr. Call stated that one's

genetic identity -- a need to know who one's "real" parents are
and where one came from -- is a very important and integral part
of the human individual.

(R.T. 918.)

According to Dr. Call, no scientific evidence exists to
support that a fetus attaches emotionally to the individual
carrying it.

Conversely, however, substantial evidence indicates

that a mother carrying a fetus' often forms an emotional
attachment, especially when the mother has planned to have the
child and has invested herself psychologically in that planning.
(R.T. 919-20.)

Some mothers never form any emotional attachment,

even after birth.
(R.T. 920.)

This seriously impairs the child's development.

The mother/baby emotional attachment essentially

forms post partum.

(R.T. 922-24.)

In fact, the baby forms such

an attachment with whomever the primary caretaker may be -mother, father, sibling, or nanny.

(R.T. 925.)

Dr. Call stated

it is very important that children be given consistent patterns of
parenting, especially when they are very young (R.T. 927) , and
that it would be very damaging to call the infant by two different
names (except for an obvious nickname).
6

(R.T. 930-31.)

Anna

wishes to call the baby Matthew, while Mark and Crispina have
named him Christopher.

(R.T. 930-31.)

Dr. Call gave his professional opinion that the strongest
connections to the baby lie with the genetic parents (R.~T. 932),
despite his acknowledgement that the surrogate mother provided
nourishment, growth, and protection for the baby.

(R.T. 964.)

Dr. Call believed that Anna's July 23rd letter to Mark and
Crispina indicated a readiness to give up the child; there was no
indication of any bonding between Anna and the child.

(R.T. 980.)

Moreover, in reference to Anna's remarks to Ms. Gewertz of the Los
Angeles Times, Dr. Call stated that a mother who would make such a
statement so close to the baby's birth would be a high risk mother
for an imperfect attachment and would have poor potential for
motherhood.

(R.T. 987-89.)

Asked to give his expert opinion as

to who should be awarded custody of the baby. Dr. Call stated,
"The child should reside with the genetic parents."

(R.T. 942.)

The parties stipulated to blood test results establishing
Mark and Crispina as the genetic parents.

(C.T. 577.).

The child

has resided with Mark and Crispina since his birth on September
19, 1990.

(R.T. 1419.)
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TERM "NATURAL MOTHER" IN THE CALIFORNIA UNIFORM PARENTAGE
ACT DENOTES THE WOMAN WHOSE EGG PROVIDES THE GENETIC MATERIAL
FOR THE CREATION OF A CHILD.
A.

The California Uniform Parentage Act's language is most
reasonably interpreted to designate the "natural mother"
a s the woman whose eoa provides the baby's oenes.

This court must determine who is the legal mother of the baby
in this case of first impression.

The answer lies in the

California Uniform Parentage Act ("U.P.A."), Civil Code sections
7

7000-7021^ in which the legislature defined most of the
potential issues regarding parent-child relationships.

It

neglected, however, to specifically distinguish between a genetic
mother and a birth mother.

That is, the code makes no explicit

reference to surrogacy arrangements.

Yet, its language focusing

on the parent/child relationship, paternity disputes, and the role
of blood tests implies that -the woman whose egg provides a baby's
genes is the "natural mother."

Consequently, Crispina C. is the

legal mother, and the judgment should be affirmed.
1.

The Uniform Parentage Act's language indicates that
a woman lacking any genetic link to a child cannot
be the child's natural mother; thus, a genetic
connection is integral to a mother/child
relationship.

The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain the legislative intent.
481, 489 (1985).

People v. Aston. 39 Cal. 3d

To determine this intent, the first step is to

look to the statute's words themselves.
Cal. 3d 1002, 1007 (1987).

People v. Woodhead. 43

If the statutory language is clear and

unambiguous the plain meaning of the statute must be followed.
Cal. Teachers Ass'n, 28 Cal. 3d at 698.

However, when statutory

language is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may look to the statutory scheme, and other
extrinsic aids,

Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008.

In defining a legal parent, the U.P.A. repeatedly refers to
the "natural parent."

That is, the code plainly defines "parent-

child relationship" as "the legal relationship existing between a
child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the
'
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless
otherwise stated.
8

law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations."

Cal. Civ. Code § 7001 (West 1983)

(emphasis added)

Thus, the legal mother is also the "natural mother."
The legislature, however, stopped short of providing a"
precise definition of a natural mother.

To find the legislative

intent as to the code section setting forth criteria for creation
of parent and child relationship, a court may look to the entire
Uniform Parentage Act and not merely at the section to be
interpreted.- Griffith v. Gibson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 465 (1977).
The U.P.A. as a whole considers the possibility that a woman
who gives birth is not necessarily the natural mother.
7003 provides:
established .

Section

"The parent and child relationship may be
. . between a child and the natural mother ... by

proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this part.
Cal. Civ. Code § 7003 (West 1983)

(emphasis added).

A natural

mother and a woman who gives birth are two separate identities
under the language of section 7003, although they are typically
the same person.

The U.P.A. strongly implies that there are

distinct criteria for defining a "natural mother," which do not
necessarily include giving birth.

The U.P.A. merely indicates

that birth is one way to establish the relationship, apparently
leaving open the possibility that the natural mother could be
someone other than the woman who bore the child.
Anna, in arguing that birth necessarily establishes
motherhood under section 7003, also fails to recognize that a
woman giving birth to a child lacking her genes was a
technological impossibility when the legislature enacted the
U.P.A. in 1975.

California's lack of legislative history for the
9

code supports this proposition.

In 1975 the procedure of

implanting an embryo formed from one woman's egg into a different
woman was still merely a futuristic concept in the minds of
scientists.

The legislature did not -- and could not

envision

any circumstances in which the woman who gave birth to a child did
not also provide the child's genes.

Yet, as is often the case,

the legislature anticipated that unexpectedly unique factual
situations might arise.

They therefore inadvertently provided for

this contingency by creating an additional clause under section
7003 ("or under this part") under which courts can determine that
a woman other than the birth mother is the natural mother.

This

language suggests that the genetic tie, and not the physical act
of giving birth, is the critical factor in identifying the natural
mother.
The rapid advancement of technology further supports a
statutory construction favoring the genetic mother.
progress continues to surprise us all.

Scientific

Since doctors can now

routinely create an embryo in a laboratory with a man's sperm
cells and a woman's ovum (as with Mark and Crispina), it is quite
conceivable that scientists will someday develop technology to
serve other biological functions as'well.
Anna.herself referred to her role as that of an incubator.
Her role was to protect’the fetus, provide it with nourishment and
fluids for its development, and remove its waste.

Someday, after

more astonishing technological advances, scientists could
conceivably create mechanical incubators that are able to perform
all of those critical functions for a fetus's development.

The

machine would contain the fetus' for the nine-month gestational
10

period.

Then, at just the right time, the doctor would simply

remove the baby from the incubator, at which time the baby would
be ■born."
Applying Anna's logic that she is the natural mother solely
for having given birth would imply that the futuristic mechanical
incubator in this scenario would be the natural mother!
absurd conclusion illustrates the point.

This

The legislature did not

envision specific advances, but they apparently anticipated that
at some point birth would not necessarily be determinative of
motherhood.

This case has finally presented the contingency for

which the legislature provided.

Under these facts, and other

possibilities in the future, the genetic link must logically be
the critical factor in establishing the natural mother.
The role of blood tests in the U.P.A. further supports
interpreting the statute to require a genetic link between the
natural mother and her child.

Civil Code section 7004 refers to

blood tests in the Evidence Code to determine the identity of a
"natural father" in paternity disputes: "[IJf the court finds that
the conclusions of all the experts . . . based upon blood tests .
.

. are that the [man] is not the father of the child, the

question of [his] paternity . . . shall be resolved accordingly."
Cal. Evid. Code § 621 (West Supp. 1992).

In other words, a man is

not the naluaral father if blood tests reveal that he has no __
genetic relationship to the child.^
^ The Evidence Code refers to conclusions in the negative,
rather than the positive, because blood tests are usually more
conclusive in establishing a lack of paternity.
In the instant
case, however,
the parties stipulated that the blood tests
conclusively determined Mark and Crispina to be the genetic parents
of the child born by Anna.
Thus, under the circumstances it is

civil Code section 7004 and Evidence Code section 621
together suggest that the genetic relationship is the key to
determining a person's parental rights and obligations, as opposed
to the~t>irth process.

In this case, the parties stipulated to

blood tests conclusively establishing Mark and Crispina as the
genetic parents, and confirming Anna's lack of any genetic
relationship to the baby.
Civil Code section 7015 allows section 7004 to be applied to
women in maternity disputes, even though it refers only to men and
paternity.

See Cal. Civ. Code § 7015 (West 1983).

Specifically,

section 7015 states that "[a]ny interested party may bring an
action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and
child relationship [and] the provisions of this part applicable to
the father and child relationship apply."

Id.

Thus, section 7015

allows section 7004's paternity blood tests to apply to a
maternity action.^

These blood tests indicate that Crispina is

the natural mother,
2.

A comparison of the original Uniform Parentage Act
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on State Laws and the California Civil Code
indicates the California Legislature intended the
genetic mother to be the natural mother.

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("Commissioners") drafted the original Uniform Parentage Act
in 1973.

Unif. Parentage Act §§ 1-29, 9A U.L.A. 587 (1979).

Shortly thereafter, several states, including California in 1975,

appropriate to apply the code in the positive when referring to
Mark and Crispina's blood tests.
^
See discussion under subheading 2, below for further
analysis of section 7015's impact in resolving maternity disputes.
12

enacted their own versions of the U.P.A. modeled after the
Commissioners' draft.

The Commissioners' Comments to the U.P.A.

reveal an intent to resolve maternity disputes in the same manner
as^aternity questions.

That is, a blood test is determinative in

establishing the identity of a natural mother, as well as a
natural father.
As discussed above, California's U.P.A. provides that "[tjhe
parent and child relationship may be established .

. .

[bjetween a

child and the natural mother by proof of her having given birth to
the child, or under this part."
(emphasis added).

Cal. Civ. Code § 7003

(West 1983)

The Commissioners' draft is virtually

identical.Thus, as discussed under the previous subheading,
the Commissioners -- and California's Legislature -- intended for
courts to loo]^ to the various other sections of the U.P.A. when
the identity of the natural mother is in question.
Section 21 of the Commissioners' U.P.A., which corresponds to
section 7015 of the California version, specifically directs
courts' attention to the U.P.A. paternity sections for. resolving
maternity contests.

That section provides,

"Any interested party

may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of
a mother and child relationship.

Insofar as practicable, the

provisions of this Act [part] applicable to the father and child
relationship apply."

Unif. Parentage Act § 21, 9A U.L.A. 612

*
The only notable difference between the California Civil
Code and the U.P.A. is that the Code reads "or under this part,"
whereas the U.P.A. reads "or under this Act."
The word "part"
apparently refers to the "part" or portion of the Civil Code that
encompasses the entire codified version of the Commissioners'
Uniform Parentage Act. It certainly does not refer to section 7003
exclusively, for there are various uses of the phrase "under this
section" elsewhere in the Civil Code to make such a reference.
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(1979)

(Cal. Civ. Code variation in brackets).

The corresponding

Corranissioners' Comment gives insight into this dual application:
This Section permits the declaration of the mother and
__child relationship where that is in dispute. Sin_ce it
is not believed that cases of this nature will arise
frequently. Sections 4 to 20 [equivalent to sections
7004 to 7014 of the Civil Code] are written principally
in terms of the ascertainment of paternity. While it is
obvious that certain provisions in these Sections would
not apply in an action to establish the mother and child
relationship, the Committee decided not to burden these
-- already complex -- provisions with references to the
ascertainment of maternity.
Unif. Parentage Act § 21, 9A U.L.A. 613 (1979)
Comment to section 21)

(Commissioners'

(emphasis in original).

The Commissioners, therefore, specifically intended that the
entire Uniform Parentage Act should be used to determine who the
natural mother is, and not just the natural father, unless such a
dual application is logically unreasonable.^
In the instant case, most significant of these sections
cross-referenced by the Commissioners is section 7004, which
provides for a determinative conclusion of paternity through the
use of blood tests under Evidence Code section 621.

The parties

have stipulated that blood tests conclusively established Mark and
Crispins as the child's genetic parents.

Thus, Crispins C. must

be the natural mother, not Anna.
Significantly, the California Legislature amended the

^
The Commissioners state that a judge presiding over a
maternity dispute "should have little difficulty deciding which
portions [of the U.P.A. referring to paternity] should be applied."
Unif. Parentage Act § 21, 9A U.L.A, 613 (1979) (Commissioners'
Comment to section 21) .
This implies that only those sections
which cannot logically fit a maternity context are inapplicable.
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Coinmissioners" heading^ to U.P.A. section 4 when it codified the
section as Civil Code section 7004.^
section 4 "Presumption of Paternity."
590 (1979) .

The Commissioners entitled
Unif. Parentage Act § 4, 9A

The legislature, on the other han^, entitled

Civil Code section 7004 "Natural father; rebuttable presumption;
conditions."

Cal. Civ. Code § 7004 (West 1983).

The legislature

apparently thought it necessary to emphasize that section 7004's
primary function was to establish the identity of the natural
father in a -paternity dispute-

Similarly, the natural mother

should be the focus of 7004 in a maternity dispute.
The Commissioners' U.P.A, section 5 (corresponding to Civil
Code section 7005), which addresses artificial insemination,
provides further evidence of the legislature's intent in defining
a natural mother.

The Commissioners' Comment under that section

reads as follows: "This Act does not deal with many complex and
serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial
insemination.

.

. .

Further consideration of other legal aspects

of artificial insemination [e.g., surrogacy]
to state legislators."
(1979)

... is recommended

Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9A U.L.A. 593

(Commissioners' Comment to section 5).

The California

Legislature ignored the Commissioners' advice and failed to add

^ "Consideration may be given to chapter and section headings
in codes in interpreting the various sections." People v. Navarr_o,
7 Cal. 3d 248, 273 (1972).
Civil Code section 7004 is virtually identical to U.P.A.
section 4, except that section 7004 adds the reference to Evidence
Code section 621 in establishing paternity by blood tests.
The
U.P.A. contains no such similar reference in section 4. However,
the U.P.A. provides similar opportunities to prove or disprove
paternity through blood tests in its sections 11 and 12, which
sections were both omitted from the California Civil Code.
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any subsections to section 7005 to specifically deal with "other
legal aspects of artificial insemination," namely surrogacy.

The

legislature evidently found U.P.A. section 5 to be adequate when
it was codified, believing blood tests would adequately resolve
the other issues not specifically addressed by the code.
The Commissioners' Uniform Parentage Act, the model for
California's version in the Civil Code, provides helpful insight
into our legislature's intent.

The Commissioners' Comments, as

well as comparisons between the U.P.A. and the Civil Code,
indicate that surrogacy disputes and other questions of maternity
are to be resolved in the same manner as paternity disputes.
Therefore, Mark and Crispina's blood tests are determinative in
establishing them as the natural parents of the child.
B.

Public policy requires that the Uniform Parentage Act, be
construed to designate the woman whose egg provides the
baby's genes as the natural mother.

Extrinsic aids, including public policy, may be used to
interpret a statute which is not clear from its language.
V.

Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1008 (1987).

People

Not only does the

Civil Code's most reasonable construction favor the genetic mother
as the natural mother, but this case also presents critical public
policy considerations to support the contention that Crispina -and generally any genetic mother -- is the natural mother under
the Civil Code.
1.

Public policy necessitates establishing a stable
legal framework for enforcing surrogacy
arrangements as they provide a valuable social
function.

For many years, couples unable to conceive or give birth to a
child were prevented from having any genetically-related children.
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That left only the alternative of adoption, which can be a slow,
frustrating, and risky procedure.

Only in recent years, through

the miracle of artificial insemination and surrogacy, have such
couples been able to start a family with children of aT least
partial genetic relation.

These scientific advances have provided

countless couples with the joy of a baby to call their own.

Many

surrogacy agreements have been formed and successfully completed
by women desiring to give the gift of a child to a couple that
could not otherwise have children.

Thus, the value of surrogacy

speaks for itself.
Unfortunately, surrogacy arrangements are subject to abuse.
The couple, or more frequently the surrogate, may have a change of
heart well into the pregnancy.

The scenario is familiar: the

surrogate decides to keep the baby, the couple is heartbroken, and
the baby ends up the innocent victim of a legal and emotional (and
often public) battle.

Not only do the couple and the child end up

as losers in the deal, but so does society as a whole.
Overburdened courts are forced to resolve yet more litigation that
should have been avoided.

Worse yet, often the courts themselves

are unable to find a solution, for they have no legal foundation
on which to form a sound decision.

Therefore, this court must

fashion a well-defined legal framework to resolve the instant case
and future surrogacy battles.
Anna J. typifies the unreliable surrogate.

Apparently

motivated solely by financial gain, Anna agreed to help the
hopeful couple realize their dream of having a child.

Anna

indicated that she fully understood the commitment she had made to
Mark and Crispina when she volunteered to be their surrogate, and
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she repeatedly expressed to the C.'s and others her lack of desire
to keep the child, referring to herself as Mark and Crispina's
"incubator."
Once Anna recognized the intensity of Mark and Crispina's
emotions for this prospective baby, she manipulated them.

Anna

requested and received from Mark and Crispins early payments for
both the first and second trimester installments.

She later

demanded the remaining funds from the C.'s more chan two months
before they were due, lest they "not get the baby.*
When Anna did not get her way, she followed through with her
threats, initiating this lawsuit.

She opportunistically sought

attention from the media, eventually succeeding in receiving an
invitation to the "Phil Donahue Show."

She gained sufficient

proceeds from her appearance on the show to pay off a welfare
fraud judgment owed to the Orange County Welfare Department.

Yet,

Anna told her roommate that she nevertheless had no intention of
keeping the child; she would put him up for adoption after her
possible victory in court.

Anna J. embodies all the abuses to

surrogacy that this court must prevent.
The legislature has not specifically addressed the question
of surrogacy arrangements.
options:

That leaves this court with two

(1) abolishing surrogacy entirely, or (2) creating

security for their enforcement in the form of a solid legal
framework.

To exercise the former option would be tragic, for it

would deprive many couples of their only practicable method of
having children.

Therefore, it is essential that this court seize

the opportunity presented here to provide clear guidelines for
surrogacy arrangements.

These public policy considerations compel
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a result in favor of the "genetic" mother.
2.

Public policy indicates that a child"s best
interests are to be parented by his or her genetic
parents.

This court's decision will affect many future chTldren,
products of embryo transplants and surrogate parenting.
children must face the consequences of the decision.
deserve consideration of their interests.

The

Thus, they

As one court recently

stated in an adoption matter, "The best interests of this young
child must be our paramount concern."
Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1251 (1991).

Adoption of Matthew B., 232

In the end, this court should

seek a result which will "maximize [the] child's opportunity to
develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult."

Id. at 1263.

Common

sense supports these statements.
Few would disagree that the essence of parenting is to act in
the best interests of the child, including making proper decisions
about such matters as education, health, nutrition, and
discipline.

The key consideration is that a child be raised by

someone who will give him or her proper care.

The ideal person

for that role is the child's parents themselves.

Yet, in this and

other surrogacy cases, where the identity of the mother is
disputed, it is critical to consider the child's best interests in
defining "natural mother."

The best interests of this child

require that he be raised by Mark and Crispina C., the people whom
he will, closely resemble both physically and genetically.
The Matthew B. court noted certain factors to consider in
determining a child's best interests:

"[A]n assessment of the

child's age, the extent of bonding . . . and the [parent's]
ability ... to provide adequate and proper care and guidance to
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the child."

Adoption of Matthew B.. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1263.

The court further noted that considering a child's best interests
requires a relative -- not absolute -- analysis.

Id. at 1264.

Therefore, this court should consider the child's best interests
as an opportunity to be raised by Mark and Crispina C., as opposed
to the alternative, Anna J.
Christopher (his name given by the C.'s) has lived with Mark
and Crispina since his birth more than two years ago.

Christopher

has undoubtedly developed a significant and irreversible bond with
Mark and Crispina during that period.

Dr. Justin Call explained

the importance of a child's emotional bonding with his caretaker
to facilitate normal development.

He stated that consistent

patterns of parenting are vital.

If Christopher were to be

removed from Mark and Crispina, the impact on Christopher's psyche
would certainly be devastating.

Moreover, a person's genetic

makeup is an integral aspect of that individual's identity,
according to Dr. Call.

This may explain why adopted children

often seek out their natural parents.

These factors all

contribute to Dr. Call's opinion concluding that Christopher
"should reside with the genetic parents."
Mark and Crispina's personal characteristics, as compared to
Anna's, further indicate that Christopher's best interests are to
remain with the C.'s.

Sara Duran's observations of Anna's

treatment of Erica indicate an irresponsible mother who sets a
poor example for her child, specifically by her unhealthy eating
habits and inappropriate behavior.

Anna's deceitful conduct with

Mark and Crispina indicates a lack of integrity.

Her trouble with

the Orange County Welfare Department is consistent with her
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pattern of dishonesty about her history of pregnancies, her
contradictory coinnents to the media, and her dubious motives for
volunteering to be Mark and Crispina's surrogate.
Finally, the evidence does not indicate that Anna^can provide
Christopher with the care and love he deserves.

Anna told Ms.

Duran that she would want to put the child up for adoption if she
won parental rights.

Moreover, until she filed suit, Anna

repeatedly expressed a lack of interest in keeping the baby, at
which time she was apparently motivated to use the baby as a
bargaining tool, and as punishment to Mark and Crispina for not
complying with her demands.

Her apparent lack of genuine interest

in the child prompted Dr. Call to express his professional concern
for the child's well-being under her care, labelling Anna as a
poor candidate for motherhood.

All these factors indicate that

granting Anna parental rights by denoting her as the natural
mother would be detrimental to Christopher.
In the end, we must recognize that this case, as well as the
Uniform Parentage Act as a whole, is ultimately about children.
We can reasonably presume that the legislature's overall
consideration in formulating these laws is to provide a scheme
that will best serve children, to let them develop into happy and
productive members of our society.

In this case, and in surrogacy

arrangements in general, such a policy requires that the U.P.A.
denote the natural mother as the woman whose egg provides the
child's genes.
II.

THE TERM "NATURAL MOTHER- IN THE CALIFORNIA UNIFORM PARENTAGE
ACT MUST DENOTE THE WOMAN WHOSE EGG PROVIDES THE GENETIC
MATERIAL FOR THE CREATION OF A CHILD IN ORDER TO COMPORT WITH
DUE PROCESS.
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A.

Because Mark and Crispina^s constitutionally recognized
liberty interest in being able to procreate
substantially outweighs any rights Anna may possess as a
gestational mother, they must be the natural parents of
the child under the right of due process in the_ynited
States and California Constitutions.
~

Mark and Crispina have a fundamental liberty interest in
being able to procreate.

Anna does not have such a fundamental

interest in parenting the implanted embryo of Mark and Crispina.
The state may not deny parental rights to Mark and Crispina in
this case; to do so would deprive them of their fundamental rights
in violation of the right of due process under the U.S. and
California Constitutions.

U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1; CAL.

CONST, art. 1, § 13.
1.

California has recognized that Mark and Crispina
possess a fundamental liberty interest in being
able to procreate.

Mark and Crispina possess a fundamental liberty interest in
procreation which stems from their guaranteed right of privacy.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that an
individual's freedom from abridgement of liberty without due
process of law encompasses an interest in freedom of privacy.
Griswold

V.

Conn.. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

This -fundamental liberty

interest- in privacy extends to the right to procreate -- to
decide whether or not to bear children.
(1973).

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

California recognized this extension of fundamental

privacy rights to procreation four years before Roe in People v.,
Belous 71 Cal. 2d 954 (1969).

The people of California eliminated

any doubt as to the propriety of extending -implied" privacy
rights to individuals, when they added the express right of
privacy to article I, section 1 of the state Constitution in 1972.
22

The California Supreme Court has interpreted this express privacyright to be a broader right than the implied federal one.
Santa Barbara v. Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 (1980)

City of

(noting that

the federal right is "narrower than what the voters approved .

.

.

when they added 'privacy' to the California Constitution.").
Since the California right is broader, it necessarily encompasses
the federal right; California guarantees every privacy right
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution.
Mark and Crispina possess a fundamental interest in being
able to procreate because they are protected as citizens of the
United States and California by the constitution of each.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Belous. 71 Cal. 2d at 954.

See

Mark and

Crispina's liberty interest in procreating is at least as strong
as the announced federal right because of California's broader
privacy right.
2.

See Adamson. 27 Cal. 3d at 130.
Anna has no fundamental liberty interest in
parenting this implanted embryo because she lacks a
genetic link to it.

The right of privacy does not protect Anna in this case
because she seeks to have new constitutional rights created -- a
fundamental interest in parenting the implanted embryo of another
couple.

The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed its

hesitance to create new rights "not readily identifiable in the
Constitution's text."
(1986)

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191

(holding that privacy interest does not extend to engaging

in homosexual sodomy).

Justice White has noted that courts should

be "extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive
content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down
legislation adopted by a State ... to promote its welfare."
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Moore V, City of E. Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(dissenting opinion).

Indeed, the "interest denominated as a

liberty" must be one that is "traditionally protected by our
society."

Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. 110, 122 T1988).

^ examination of the history of the interest which Anna
proposes reveals that it has not been traditionally protected.
Privacy rights are implied by the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment.

See Griswold. 381 U.S. at 479.

To be

traditionally protected an interest logically must "predate" those
amendments.

Such interest must have been fundamental when those

amendments were written; it must have had protection in our
society at that time.®

Activities which did not exist when the

amendments were adopted cannot logically be "traditionally
protected by our society."

See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.

Some activities that, unlike parenting an implanted embryo,
have been traditionally practiced in our society have nevertheless
been found not to be traditionally protected.

For example, though

homosexual sodomy has been practiced throughout the history of our
country, the U.S. Supreme Court has held its practice to be an
interest not traditionally protected by our society.
U.S. at 191.

Bowers. 478

Similarly, unwed fathers have long treated-their

offspring as their children, but the courts have been unwilling to
extend parental rights to them.

See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110;

® It can be argued that the California right of privacy,
expressly adopted in 1972, necessarily encompasses all rights
"traditionally protected" in and before that year.
If correct,
however, this analysis would have no effect here.
Interests
protected before adoption of the Bill of Rights would remain
protected.
Yet embryo transplantation did not exist in 1972; it
would remain unprotected under this analysis.
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Lehr

V.—Robertson,

463 U.S. 248 (1943)

(denying unwed father's

right of notice of child's adoption proceedings),

Though these

activities did exist before the adoption of the Bill of_Rights,
they are still not seen as traditionally protected practices.
In the case at bar, Anna seeks to extend a liberty interest
to a practice -- parenting another couple's implanted embryo -which came into existence only in the past few years.’

Such a

new practice cannot be a fundamental liberty interest encompassed
in the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment; it was not only
unprotected, but did not exist throughout our history.

Therefore,

Anna has no fundamental liberty interest in parenting the
implanted embryo of Mark and Crispins.
3.

Whatever rights Anna may possess from carrying the
child are subordinate to Mark and Crispins's
fundamental liberty interest in being able to
procreate; due process therefore requires that
their parental rights be upheld.

Mark and Crispins's liberty interest in being able to
procreate mandates that their parental rights be upheld here.
Defining natural mother in the U.P.A. as the woman who gives birth
would violate substantive due process by abridging Mark and
Crispins's fundamental interest in procreation without a
compelling state interest.

Further, Respondents' fundamental

rights substantially outweigh any rights that Petitioner may
possess in this case.

Finally, Anna waived any rights to this

child by entering into the surrogacy agreement.

Again, the "pre-1972" California analysis would have no
effect here if adopted.

a.

The 'natural mother" cannot be defined as the
woman who gives birth without unduly abridging
Mark and Crispina's fundamental interest in
procreation in violation of the due process
clause.

“Th order to comport with substantive due process, the U.F.A.
must define the Respondents as the natural parents.

Interpreting

natural mother to denote the woman who gives birth would abridge,
indeed completely eliminate, Crispina's right to procreate.
Crispina's tumors and resulting hysterectoiry have left in vitro
fertilization as her only means of exercising her fundamental
right to procreate.

Defining natural mother as birth mother for

the purposes of the U.P.A. would cut off Crispina's means to
exercise her fundamental right to procreate.
Substantive due process dictates that the state can abridge
Crispina's fundamental liberty interest only if the state shows
that its action furthers a compelling state interest, which it has
failed to do in this case.

See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Weber

v. City Council of Thousand Oaks. 9 Cal. 3d 950 (1973).

State

abridgement of rights which are not deemed to be fundamental is
subject to a less stringent standard.

In such a case the state

action is upheld unless it is found to be arbitrary or
unreasonable.

Weber. 9 Cal. 3d at 958-959.

In applying this

standard a court considers all the circumstances, including policy
considerations, surrounding the state action to determine whether
such action is .rationally related to furthering the state's
purpose.

Id.

Because Crispina's interest in parenting her child is
fundamental. denying protection of this right (through
interpreting the statute to define natural mother as birth mother)
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can only be justified if it advances a compelling state interest.
^ Griswold 381 U.S. at 479; Weber. 9 Cal. 3d at 959. ’ However,
neither a compelling state interest nor its advancement-has been
demonstrated here.

Further, adopting Anna's suggested

interpretation would in this case directly hinder the state
interest of preserving contract rights by effectively voiding the
agreement of the parties.

Because no state interest is advanced

by the suggested statutory definition, no justification exists
here for abridging Crispina's fundamental right to procreate.
Even if Crispina's right is deemed to be less than
fundamental, the interpretation suggested by Anna is unreasonable
because couples who cannot create their own child need these
arrangements.

Policy ramifications demonstrate such

unreasonableness; in fact, policy supports upholding the
interpretation of natural mother as genetic mother.

Adopting

Anna's interpretation would leave any woman who is unable to bear
a child absolutely unable to raise a child created from her egg
and her husband's sperm.

Such a decision would encourage

surrogates to break their contractual arrangements with donating
couples, effectively eliminating any assurances of the fulfillment
of the arrangement.

Such a tenuous option in exercising one's

constitutional rights is effectively no option at all.

Further,

surrogates such as Petitioner choose to be implanted; in fact,
Anna volunteered in this case.

The record indicates that Anna has

tormented the Respondents psychologically because she had a change
of heart.

It is unreasonable for the state to invalidate Mark and

Crispina's rights to support the rights of a surrogate who
capriciously changed her mind.

Finally, the resolution of this dispute has a broad effect
upon the needs of society, which requires a continued definition
of the natural mother as the genetic mother.

One California

court, in interpreting the U.P.A., has recommended 'deferring to
the legislature in matters involving complex social and policy
ramifications far beyond the facts of the case."
Michele G.. 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 841 (1991)

Nancv S. v.

(denying parental

rights to lesbian companion of genetic and birth mother after
separation).

California must continue to interpret the U.P.A. as

applying to genetic mothers; if natural mother is to mean anything
different the legislature must make that change.

Id.

The state cannot define the natural mother as birth mother
without abridging Mark and Crispina's fundamental interest in
parenting their child.

Because there is no compelling state

interest advanced by such a definition, and such a definition
would be unreasonable, application of this interpretation would
violate substantive due process of law.
b.

Anna's right to procreate is not abridged here
because she can still choose whether to bear a
child; therefore Mark and Crispina's
fundamental right to procreate substantially
outweighs any rights Anna may possess in this
case, and must be preferred in order to
comport with due process of law.

Mark and Crispina's fundamental right to procreate must be
preferred to any inferior rights which Anna may possess in this
case because their interests substantially outweigh hers.
does possess a general liberty interest in procreating.
410 U.S. at 113; Belous. 71 Cal. 2d at 954.

Anna
See Roe,

However, a decision

in favor of Mark and Crispina here does not prohibit Anna, or
surrogates generally, from exercising that right in the future.
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Anna also claims that both she and her daughter have become
attached to the new child, which gives her parental rights.
However, attachment is not a sole basis for parental rights.
Applying such reasoning, babysitters and child care specialists
would also be able to claim such rights.

Finally, Anna

■YQlyPtpggred to place herself in this position; it is illogical for
her to claim that the U.P.A., which confirms her decision to act
as surrogate only, grants her substantive rights in the
alternative.

Indeed, had Anna wished to fulfill her commitment,

and had the couple subsequently defaulted on their duties,
certainly Anna would have invoked the U.P.A.

(with a definition of

natural mother as genetic mother) to support her action to enforce
the contract.
The correct approach to the conflicting interests in this
case is to prefer the more fundamental interest possessed by the
Respondents.

The United States Supreme Court has pointed out that

interests tend to collide when a husband, wife, and third party
all claim parental rights to the same child{ren) .
U.S. at 130.

Michael H.. 491

Granting parental rights to Mark and Crispins must

necessarily diminish the inferior rights (if any) of Anna.

The

appellate court here, confronted with such a collision of
interests, correctly noted that "[gjiven that Mark and Crispins
are the 'natural parents,' due process can hardly be used to
deprive them of the traditional parental relationship which they
might otherwise be able to enjoy."
App, 3d 1557, 1575 (1991).

Anna J. v. Mark C.. 234 Cal.

Because the rights of Mark and

Crispins substantially outweigh any rights Anna might be found to
possess, and because only they or she can have parental rights.
7Q

due process mandates that their parental rights be preferred to
hers.
__

c.

Anna waived any rights, including
_
constitutional rights, which this court may
find her to possess in this case by signing
and accepting the benefits of the surrogacy
agreement,

Even if this court finds that a woman lacking a genetic link
possesses a liberty interest in a child that she bears, Anna
waived such interest here by entering into the surrogacy agreement
with Mark and Crispina.

The United States Supreme Court has held

that constitutional rights can be waived in the same manner that
all rights can be waived.
U.S. 407 (1917)

Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co.. 244

("There is no sanctity in such a claim of

constitutional right as prevents its being waived as any other
claim of right may be.").

California has followed this rationale,

finding that acceptance of the benefits conferred by legislation
constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge that statute on
constitutional grounds.
672-673 (1958) .

People v. Hvmes. 161 Cal. App. 2d 668,

In Hvmes. the defendant voluntarily invoked the

Sexual Psychopathy Act ("S.P.A."), which allowed for a
determination of possible psychosis of criminal defendants in sex
crime prosecutions. Id. at 669-670.

The act provided for its

invocation by the judge, the prosecutor, or the defendant.
670.

Id. at

Hymes sought to accept the benefits of observation, care,

and treatment which the S.P.A. afforded him.

Id. at 673.

However, after being committed to an institution as a sexual
psychopath, Hymes challenged the constitutionality of the
legislation.

Id.

The court held that "having invoked the

beneficent provisions of the law," the defendant could not "be

heard to question the constitutionality" of it.

Hymes 161 Cal.

App. 2d at 673.
Because Anna has accepted the benefits of the Uniform
Parentage Act with a definition of natural mother as genetic
mother, under Hymes she cannot now challenge this application of
the act.

The U.P.A., so defined, allows women to be surrogate

mothers of the another couple's genetic child.

Without the

protection of parental rights which this definition provides,
there would be no market for surrogate mothers such as Anna.

The

parties signed their contract under the auspices of the U.P.A.,
which allowed for their contractual relationship.

Anna

contractually agreed to carry the embryo of Mark and Crispina to
term and to relinquish all parental rights to the child.

In

return, Mark and Crispina agreed to pay Anna $10,000 in
installments for her services, and to take out a $200,000
insurance policy on her life.

Anna accepted both installment

payments and the insurance policy -- she accepted the benefits due
her under the contract for which the act (only with natural mother
defined as genetic mother) provided.

After accepting these

benefits, Anna "cannot be heard to question the constitutionality"
of the Uniform Parentage Act.

Hvmes. 161 Cal. App. 2d at 673.

Anna waived her right to claim that the statute is
unconstitutionally defined because she accepted the benefits of
that definition when she contracted with the Respondents.
®•

Refining Mark and Crispina as the natural parents of
their child comports with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution because this definition is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose, and the
alternative definition is a suspect classification and
does not advance a compelling state interest.

A definition of the genetic mother as the natural mother, and
the surrogate mother as not the natural mother, is a rational
distinction advancing a legitimate state purpose, and thus
granting parental rights to the Respondents does not violate equal
protection.

However, the opposite interpretation would define

Mark as the natural father, but not Crispina as the natural
mother.

This discrimination based upon gender is inherently

suspect, yet does not advance a compelling state interest, and
therefore violates the equal protection clause.
1.

Defining the genetic, and not the surrogate, mother
as the natural mother is rational and thus does not
violate the equal protection clause.

Defining Crispina as the natural mother under the U.P.A.
comports with equal protection because it creates rational
classifications for her and Anna which are related to legitimate
purposes.

The Supreme Court has declared that classifications of

individuals for the purpose of different applications of
legislation are subject to a two-tiered test of constitutionality.
See Bernal v. Fainter. 467 U.S. 216 (1984); Plvler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm^rs. 394 U.S. 802
(1969).

California has also applied this test.

Council of Thousand Oaks. 9 Cal. 3d 950 (1973).

See Weber v. City
If the case does

not involve "suspect classifications," the challenged statute is
constitutional if it "bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose."

Id. at 958-959.

If, however, the

statute does involve suspect classifications, the classification
must be strictly scrutinized -- it is upheld only if it is
"necessary for the furtherance of a compelling state interest."
-Id. at 959.

'Suspect classifications include primarily those based
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on race and gender.

Korematsu v. U.S.. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)

(holding race to be a suspect classification); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)

(holding gender to be a suspect

classification),
Defining Crispina, and not Anna, as the natural mother is not
a suspect classification; it is based not upon race or gender, but
upon differing contributions to the creation of a child.
Therefore, this definition is constitutional if it is rational to
advance a legitimate state purpose.
The U.P.A., with the genetic mother definition, is a highly
rational means of effectuating state purposes because it upholds
fundamental liberty interests.

As discussed, Mark and Crispina

have a fundamental liberty interest in being able to procreate.
It is undisputed that the state has a legitimate purpose in
upholding fundamental liberties.

The genetic mother definition of

natural mother furthers this state purpose by making it possible.
In fact, the classification between genetic mothers and surrogates
who bear implanted embryos not only bears a rational relationship
to the aforementioned state purpose, it effectuates it by making
it possible.

The state also has a legitimate purpose of

preserving contract rights.

The classification here is rationally

related to achieving that end.

Defining the genetic, and not the

surrogate, mother as the natural mother for the purposes of the
Uniform Parentage Act is rationally related to a state purpose and
thus comports with the equal protection clause.
2.

The Equal Protection Clause would be violated by
defining the woman who gives birth as the natural
mother because this would discriminate on the basis
of gender by leaving Mark as the natural father,
while Crispina would not be the natural mother.
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Application of the definition suggested by Anna would violate
equal protection by discriminating between the Respondents on the
basis of gender.

Anna urges that the court define the woman who

gives birth, and not the genetic mother, as the "natural mother."
Such a definition would classify Crispina as not the natural
mother.

However, under the act Mark would still be classified as

the natural father.

Mark and Crispina have taken equal actions in

this case; they have each contributed their respective body
material, and have jointly given money, time, and support to Anna.
Mark and Crispina are thus similarly situated, except for their
gender.

Therefore the definition proposed by Anna would

discriminate between the two of them on the basis of gender.

See

Anna J.. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1576.
This classification based upon gender is inherently suspect.
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677.

Because the classification

suggested by Anna would thus be suspect, it must be viewed under
strict scrutiny, and upheld only if it is necessary to further a
compelling state interest.

Weber. 9 Cal. 3d at 959.

The classification which Anna suggests would not further a
compelling state interest.
been shown.

Again, no such compelling interest has

In fact, such a classification would directly hinder

state purposes.

As mentioned, the state has an interest in

upholding individuals' fundamental liberties.

But the suggested

classification would effectively eliminate the ability of women
who cannot give birth to children to pursue their fundamental
interest in bearing a biologically related child, thus posing an
obstacle to the state interest.

Further, such a classification

hgre would hinder the state purpose of preserving contract rights.
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Therefore, defining Petitioner as the natural mother would violate
Respondents' rights of equal protection.
CONCLUSION
The California Uniform Parentage Act's language is most
reasonably interpreted to designate the "natural mother" as the
woman whose egg provides the baby's genes.

Public policy

considerations support this interpretation.
In addition, because Mark and Crispina's liberty interest in
procreating substantially outweighs any rights Anna may possess,
they must be the natural parents of the child under due process
rights.

Defining Mark and Crispins as the natural parents

comports with the Equal Protection Clause because this definition
is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
For these reasons. Respondents Mark and Crispins C. pray this
court to affirm the judgment of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal granting full parental rights under the California Uniform
Parentage Act.

Respectfully submitted,
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